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In , however, its meaning consisted in formulating orthodoxy as a ques- tion set in terms of the jurisdiction of the state Staatsrecht. But it was only after the Thirty Years War had worn down the Ger- mans that they were able to make the principle of religious indifference the basis for peace.
While in the West modern states arose from guerre civile and civil war, the religious war in Germany transformed itself—thanks to intervention— into a war between states, whose outcome paradoxically gave new life to the Holy Roman Empire. What consequences did the new arrangement of politics and religion have for the construction of the modern apprehension of time, and what displacement of the future had this process brought with it?
The experience won in a century of bloody struggles was, above all, that the religious wars did not herald the Final Judgment, at least not in the direct manner hitherto envisaged. And this disclosed a new and unorthodox future. This process took place slowly, and had been prepared well in advance. The first shift can be found in the fact that by the fifteenth century, and in part earlier, the expected End of the World was progressively prorogued.
Nicolaus von Cues at one time placed it at the beginning of the eighteenth century; Melanchthon calculated that the final epoch would begin to wane with the passing of two thousand years from the birth of Christ. The last great papal prophecy in , attributed to Malachias, extended by a factor of three the customary list of Popes, so that reckoning according to the aver- age duration of papal rule the end of all time could be expected in , at the earliest.
Newton himself proph- esied around that papal rule would end in Astrological calcula- tion of the future pushed eschatological expectations into a constantly receding future. Ultimately, expectations of the End were undermined by apparently natural determinants. A symbolic coincidence is that in the year of the Peace of Augsburg, , Nostradamus published his Centuries. He did, of course, complete his visions with a prophecy of the End quite in keeping with the traditional spirit; the intervening period, however, was formulated in terms of an endless array of undatable, variable oracles, confronting the interested reader with an immeasurably extended future.
Third, with the paling of presentiments of the End, the Holy Roman Empire lost its eschatological function, in a manner distinct from that ear- lier. Since the Peace of Westphalia, it had become clear at the very least that the preservation of peace had become the business of the European system of states. Bodin here played a role as historian which was quite as path- breaking as his foundation of the concept of sovereignty.
In separating sacral, human, and natural history, Bodin transformed the question of the End of the World into a problem of astronomical and mathematical calcu- lation. The End of the World became a datum within the cosmos, and escha- tology was forced into a specially prepared natural history. Working within a cabbalistic tradition, Bodin considered it quite possible that this world would end only after a cycle of 50, years. The Holy Roman Empire was thus stripped of its sacred task.
The maintenance of peace was the task of the state, not the mis- sion of an empire. If there were any land with a claim to the succession of imperial power it was the Turkish Empire, which spread itself over three continents. The setting free of a historia humana which turned away from sacral history, and the legitimation of a modern state capable of subduing salvation-oriented religious factions, are for Bodin one and the same.
This leads to a fourth point. The genesis of the absolutist state is accom- panied by a sporadic struggle against all manner of religious and political pre- dictions. The state enforced a monopoly on the control of the future by sup- pressing apocalyptic and astrological readings of the future.
In doing so, it assumed a function of the old Church for anti-Church objectives. Disobedient prophets could expect lifelong imprisonment. Henry III of France and Richelieu followed the English example so that they could stop up once and for all the source of a steady stream of religious pre- sentiments.
This was also apparent in England, where during the Puritan Revolution the old expectations, expressed in prophetic terms, were once again preva- lent. But the last great predictive struggle conducted on a political plane—in and over the question of whether or not a Restoration would occur— was already argued out in the language of critical philology. The republican astrologer Lilly proved that his Cavalier enemies had falsely quoted from their sources.
And if Cromwell made his intentions for the coming year popularly available in the form of an almanac, this is to be attributed more to his cold realism than to any belief in revelations. The basic lines of prediction were always limited, although they were creatively formulated well into the seventeenth century. It was an epilogue. The course of the seventeenth century is characterized by the destruction of interpretations of the future, however motivated.
Where it had the power, the state persecuted their utterance, such as in the Cevennes uprising, ulti- mately driving them into private, local, folkloristic circles or secret associa- tions. Parallel to this developed a 1iterary feud conducted by humanists and skeptics against oracles and associated superstitions. The first well-known people to become involved were Montaigne and Bacon, who revealed the psychology of prophecy in penetrating essays, well before their contempo- raries.
He not only denounced visions as the customary subterfuge of con- temporary factions which were either subversive or merely ambitious, but he also went a step further and sought to unmask canonical prophecy as the vic- tim of primitive powers of self-delusion. The facility with which anticipations of devout Christians, or predictions of all kinds, could be transformed into political action had disappeared by Political calculation and humanist reservations marked out a new plane for the future.
Neither the One Big End of the World nor the several smaller ones could apparently affect the course of human affairs. Instead of the antic- ipated millennium, a new and different temporal perspective had opened up. Here we touch on a fifth point. But these con- cepts became established for the entirety of historical time in a gradual man- ner from the second half of the seventeenth century.
Since then, one has lived in Modernity and been conscious of so doing. It is possible to identify two types, relating to each other as well as referring back to expectations of salvation: rational prognosis and the phi- losophy of historical process Geschichtsphilosophie.
The rational forecast, the prognosis, became the counterconcept of contemporary prophecy. The delicate art of political calculation was first developed in fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Italy, and then brought to a peak of finesse during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the cabinets of the European courts. The future became a domain of finite possibilities, arranged according to their greater or lesser probability. It is the same plane that Bodin disclosed for the opera- tion of historia humana.
Weighing the probability of forthcoming or nonoc- curring events in the first instance eliminated a conception of the future taken for granted by religious factions: the certainty that the Last Judgment would enforce a simple alternative between Good and Evil through the establishment of a single principle of behavior. For a politician, on the other hand, the only remaining moral judgment related to measuring the greater or lesser evil. It was in this sense that Riche- lieu stated that nothing was more important for a government than fore- sight: only in this manner was one able to avoid evils that, once encountered, were increasingly difficult to evade.
The second consequence of such a posi- tion was preparedness for possible surprise, for it was generally not this or that possibility that would be realized, but a third, or fourth, and so on. The prog- nosis is a conscious element Moment of political action. It is related to events whose novelty it releases. Hence time continually emanates from the prognosis in an unforeseeable, but predictable, manner. Prognosis produces the time within which and out of which it weaves, whereas apocalyptic prophecy destroys time through its fixation on the End.
From the point of view of prophecy, events are merely symbols of that which is already known. A disappointed prophet cannot doubt the truth of his own predictions. Since these are variable, they can be renewed at any time. More- over, with every disappointment, the certainty of approaching fulfillment increases. An erroneous prognosis, by contrast, cannot even be repeated as an error, remaining as it does conditioned by specific assumptions. Rational prognosis assigns itself to intrinsic possibilities, but through this produces an excess of potential controls on the world.
Time is always reflected in a surprising fashion in the prognosis; the constant similitude of eschatological expectation is dissolved by the continued novelty of time run- ning away with itself and prognostic attempts to contain it. In terms of tem- poral structure, then, prognosis can be seen to be the integrating factor of the state that transgresses the limited future of the world to which it has been entrusted. Let us take a favorite example from classical diplomacy: the first parti- tion of Poland.
The manner in which it was done, and not the reason, can easily be traced to Frederick the Great. Frederick lived, after the embit- tering struggles of the Seven Years War, with a dual fear. First, there was the fear of Austrian revenge. To reduce the chances of this possibility, he con- cluded an alliance with Russia. Both prog- nostications, the short-term Austrian and the long-term Russian, now entered into political action in a fashion that altered the conditions of the prognosis, that is, altered the immediate situation.
The existence of a Greek Orthodox population in Poland provided the Russians with a constant pre- text for intervention on the grounds of religious protection. The Russian envoy, Repnin, ruled like a governor-general in Warsaw and directly super- vised the meetings of the Polish National Assembly.
Unpopular representa- tives were soon dispatched to Siberia. This growing threat in the East brought the long-term threat dangerously close. In , the situation worsened. Austria had no desire to tolerate the situation. It saw in the annexation of Romania a casus belli. Thus Frederick, as the ally of Russia, was in addition bound to the second of the feared evils, a war against Aus- tria, which he did not want. The solution to this dilemma, discovered by Frederick in , is quite startling. As soon as Frederick learned before the Russians could know that the Austrians shrank from the prospect of war, he forced Russia, through the pressure of his obligation to assist them in the event of war, to dispense with the annexation of Romania.
In compensation, Russia received the eastern part of Poland, which in any case it already ruled; in return, Prussia and Aus- tria gained West Prussia and Galicia—significant territories, but which, more importantly, were thereby removed from Russian influence. Instead of smoothing the way westward for his intimidating ally in the course of war, Frederick had preserved his peace and had strategically blocked Russian intrusion into the bargain.
Frederick had made a double gain out of what had seemed mutually contradictory elements. Such flexible play with a limited but within these limits almost infinite number of varied possibilities was clearly possible only in a particular his- torical situation.
What is the nature of this historical plane in which abso- lutist politics could be refined? The future was a known quantity insofar as the number of politically active forces remained restricted to the number of rulers. Behind each ruler stood an army and a population of known dimen- sions whose potential economic power and monetary circulation could be estimated by cameralistic means. In the domain of a politics constituted by the actions of sovereign rulers, though only in this domain, nothing particularly new could happen.
Characteristic of this is the ultimate boundary within which political calculation operated. Hume, who himself made long-term, contingent prog- noses, once said that a doctor forecast with confidence no more than two weeks in advance, and a politician a few years at most. Character, for instance, was such a constant; it could be esti- mated, relying, for instance, on the corruptibility of a minister.
But above all, the assumed life span of a governing ruler was a permanent feature of the political calculus of probability. The uttermost future that the Venetian envoy in Paris predicted in for the coming half-century was his cer- tainty that there would be a War of Spanish Succession: it did indeed take place exactly fifty years later. The fact that most of the wars conducted among European rulers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were wars of succession clearly demonstrates the manner in which the dimensions of historical time were measured by natural, human qualities.
Based as it was on the life and character of acting personages, the Euro- pean republic of rulers could still understand history in natural terms. It is not surprising that the ancient pattern of cycles put back in circulation by Machiavelli found such general support.
This experience of history, founded as it was on repeatability, bound prospective futures to the past. This certainly makes clear that the distance separating the early modern political consciousness of time from that of Christian eschatology was nowhere as great as it might seem.
Sub specie aeternitatis nothing novel can emerge, whether the future is viewed in terms of faith, or of sober calcula- tion. A politician could become more clever or even cunning; he could refine his technique; he could become wiser or more farsighted: but history never conveyed him into unknown regions of the future. The reoccupation of a prophesied future by a predicted future had not yet fundamentally ruptured the plane of Christian expectations.
That is what harnesses the republic of rulers to the Middle Ages, even if it no longer conceives of itself as Christian. It was the philosophy of historical process which first detached early modernity from its past and, with a new future, inaugurated our modernity. A consciousness of time and the future begins to develop in the shadows of absolutist politics, first in secret, later openly, sustained by an audacious combination of politics and prophecy.
There enters into the philosophy of progress a typical eighteenth-century mixture of rational prediction and sal- vational expectation. Progress occurred to the extent that the state and its prognostication was never able to satisfy soteriological demands which per- sisted within a state whose own existence depended upon the elimination of millenarian expectations. The prorogued End of the World had been constituted by the Church and then projected in the form of a static time capable of being expe- rienced as a tradition.
Political prognostication also had a static temporal structure, insofar as it operated in terms of natural magnitudes whose poten- tial repeatability formed the cyclical character of its history. The prognosis implies a diagnosis which introduces the past into the future. This always- already guaranteed futurity of the past opened out yet bounded the sphere of action available to the state.
To the extent that the past can be experienced only insofar as it contains an element of what is to come and vice versa , the political existence of the state remains trapped within a temporal structure that can be understood as static mobility. Progress opened up a future that transcended the hitherto predictable, natural space of time and experience, and thence—propelled by its own dynamic—provoked new, transnatural, long-term prognoses.
The future contained in this progress is characterized by two main fea- tures: first, the increasing speed with which it approaches us, and second, its unknown quality. This began to be apparent well before the French Revolution. Present at the baptism of the prophetic philosopher in the role of godfather was a combination of political calculation and speculation on a future liberated from Christian religion. He wants this future to come more quickly, and he himself wants to accelerate it.
In other words, in the eigh- teenth century, the acceleration of time that had previously belonged to eschatology became obligatory for worldly invention, before technology completely opened up a space of experience adequate to this acceleration. What was conceived before the Revolution as katechon itself became a stimulus to revolution. Reaction, still employed in the eighteenth century as a mechanical category, came to function as a movement that sought to halt it.
Revolution, at first derived from the natural movement of the stars and thus introduced into the natural rhythm of history as a cyclical metaphor, henceforth attained an irreversible direction. It appears to unchain a yearned-for future while the nature of this future robs the present of mate- riality and actuality; thus, while continually seeking to banish and destroy Reaction, it succeeds only in reproducing it: modern Revolution remains ever affected by its opposite, Reaction.
This alternation of Revolution and Reaction, which supposedly heralds the attainment of an ultimate paradise, has to be understood as a futureless future, because the reproduction and necessarily inevitable supersession of the contradiction brings about an evil endlessness.
This fixation on an end-state by historical actors turns out to be the subterfuge of a historical process that robs them of judgment. Needed, therefore, is historical prog- nostication that goes beyond the rational prognoses of the politicians and, as the legitimate offspring of historical philosophy, can moderate the histori- cal-philosophical design. There is evidence of this before the French Revolution.
Predictions of the Revolution are numerous, although only a few look forward to a succeeding epoch and its nature. Rousseau was one of the greatest forecast- ers, whether it was a matter of forecasting the perpetual state of crisis or reg- istering the subjugation of Europe by the Russians and of the Russians by the Asians.
We will not examine here the variety of wishful or forced prognoses with the aid of which the Enlightenment built up its self-confidence. Among them, however, is to be found one of the greatest predictions, which has remained in the shadows of anonymity and geographical camouflage up to the present. This concerns a prediction made in , apparently relating to Sweden but aimed also at France. The author is Diderot, who wrote: Under despotism the people, embittered by their lengthy sorrows, will miss no opportunity to reappropriate their rights.
But since there is neither goal nor plan, slavery relapses in an instant into anarchy. Nobody knows. And soon the people are divided into various factions, eaten up with contradictory interests. The moment of plotting and conspiracy. In this, royalism serves as a subterfuge as much as antiroyalism.
Both are masks for ambition and covetousness. The nation now is merely an entity dependent upon a collection of criminals and corrupt persons. In this situation only one man and a suitable moment are needed for an entirely unexpected result to emerge. If the moment comes, the man emerges. He speaks to the people, who until this moment believe themselves all: You are nothing.
And they say: We are nothing. And he speaks to them: I am the Lord. And they speak as if out of one mouth: You are the Lord. And he says to them: Here are the conditions according to which I am pre- pared to subject you. And they say: We accept them.
What will suc- ceed this revolution? No one knows. He proposed a long-term prognosis, assuming the certainty of the as yet unknown beginning of the revolution; and further disclosed the dual watchwords of Good and Evil, Freedom and Slavery, tracing them to the dialectic of liberty; and thence derived the unexpected result.
This expressed in modern terminology the full scope of the classical model. But Diderot inquired further. Forit was not clear to him how things would pro- ceed from that point. He therefore formulated the same question that Toqueville would later take up, and which today remains for us to answer. Napoleon was never a man of taste, but the Alexanderschlacht was his favorite painting, and he wanted it in his inner sanctum. Did he sense the way in which the history of the Occident was present in this painting?
It is possible. Napoleon saw himself as a parallel to the great Alexander, and more. The power of tradition was so strong that the long-lost, salvational- historical task of the Holy Roman Empire shimmered through the suppos- edly new beginning of the Revolution. Napoleon, who had definitively destroyed the Holy Roman Empire, afterward married the daughter of the last emperor, just as two thousand years earlier Alexander had married the daughter of Darius, likewise in a premeditated second marriage.
Napoleon made his son king of Rome. When he was overthrown, Napoleon said that this marriage was the only true mistake he had ever made, that is, to have resumed a tradition that the Revolution, with himself at its head, appeared to have destroyed. Was it really a failure? But he risked a lie since he calculated its effect—appealing rhetorically to the schooling of his opponent.
That effect relied on the force of that old topos, according to which history is supposed to be the great teacher of life. The privy councilor acquiesced to this formula, not to an argument. Historia magistra vitae. What does the application of this topos to our Charlottenburg example tell us? Thanks to his skill in argument, Raumer placed his colleagues in a seemingly continuous space of experience, but one that he himself treated with irony. The scene demonstrates the continuing role of history as the teacher of life, while also demonstrating how questionable this role had become.
Before pursuing the question of the degree to which this older topos had dissolved into a modernized historical process, we need to look back on its persistence. It lasted almost unbroken into the eighteenth century. Until the present we have had no account of all the expressions through which his- toricity has been conceptualized.
Despite a verbal identity, the coordinates of our formula have varied greatly over time. It was not unusual for historiographers to reduce the topos to an empty rubric, only used in prefaces. It is therefore more difficult to identify the difference that always prevailed between the mere use of a commonplace and its prac- tical effectiveness.
Besides this problem, however, the longevity of our topos is certainly instructive, indicating its flexibility in accommodating the most diverse conclusions. For Montaigne, histories showed how every generalization was nullified, whereas Bodin used them to disclose gen- eral rules. It implies a thorough apprehension of human possibili- ties within a general historical continuum. Until the eighteenth century, the use of our expression remained an unmistakable index for an assumed constancy of human nature, accounts of which can serve as iterable means for the proof of moral, theological, legal, or political doctrines.
Likewise, the utility of our topos depended on a real constancy of those circumstances implying the potential similitude of earthly events. If there were a degree of social change, it occurred so slowly and over such a period that the utility of past examples was retained. The temporal structure of past history bounded a continuous space of potential experience.
I The idiom historia magistra vitae was coined by Cicero, borrowing from a Hellenistic pattern. The usage is, more- over, associated with further metaphors indicating the tasks of history. Monastery libraries not infrequently catalogued his philosophical works as collections of examples, and were widely available. The apologists of Christianity had no little trouble passing on as precedents events belonging to a profane history, and a hea- then one at that.
Nonetheless, even Isidor allowed heathen histories an educational function, if somewhat covertly. Nor did the linear schema of biblical prefiguration and its fulfillment—right up to Bossuet—rupture the framework within which one derived lessons for the future out of the past.
As millennarial expectations became more volatile, ancient history, in its role of teacher, once more forced itself to the fore. At the head of his Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem, Bodin placed the Ciceronian topos: this prominence was owed to the way in which it indi- cated the holy laws of history, thanks to which men could recognize their present and illuminate the future—and this was not intended as a theologi- cal, but as a practical political statement.
In this way one preaches more to under- standing than to memory; history becomes pleasant and interesting for the pupil, and he is imperceptibly instructed in the prudence of both private and state affairs, and educated in the way of artes belli ac pacis.
Without prejudice to these evidently historiographic statements, one should not underestimate the practical, didactic force of early modern his- torico-political literature. The increasing refinement of contemporary politics was mirrored in the reflections of memoirists and the doings reported by envoys. But in this way it remained bound to the indices of Kameralistik and Statis- tik: the chronicling of space.
It is more than a habitual topos that Frederick the Great constantly invokes in his memoirs: that history is the school of the ruler, from Thucydides to Commynes, Cardinal Retz, or Colbert. By contin- ually comparing earlier cases, he claimed to have sharpened his powers of deduction. Naturally, there were objections to the maxim according to which one could learn from history. The stupidities of the fathers are lost upon their children; each generation must commit its own.
For the contention that one could learn noth- ing from history was itself a certainty born of experience, a historical lesson that could render the knowing more insightful, more prudent, or, to borrow a term from Burckhardt,29 wiser. The constant possibility of otherness proved so powerless in abolishing similitude from the world that this other- ness cannot as a consequence be conceived as an otherness.
Nevertheless, at the same time the meaningful content of our idiom was hollowed out. The ancient form of History was pushed from its lectern, not least by enlightened men who made such free use of its teachings; and all in the course of a move- ment bringing past and future into a new relationship. This new history assumed a temporal quality peculiar to itself, whose diverse times and shift- ing periods of experience drew its evidence from an exemplary past.
This process will now be used to investigate symptomatic points in the transformation of our topos. II As a way of characterizing this event—of a newly emergent tempo- rality—we will use a statement from Tocqueville. Behind this is concealed a complex process whose course is in part invisible and gradual, sometimes sudden and abrupt, and which is ultimately driven forward consciously. Begriffsgeschichte, as practiced here, serves as a preliminary means for determining the nature of this process.
It can show how shifting semantic relations break up and distort our topos as it is handed down. Only through this process does the idiom gain its own history; but at the same time, this history does away with its peculiar truth.
To begin in the German language area, there first occurred a termino- logical displacement that emptied the older topos of meaning, or at least fur- thered this. Since around , the turn from Historie toward Geschichte is detectable and emphatic enough to be statisti- cally measurable.
To be sure, Geschichte had for a considerable time implied such an account, just as Historie referred to an event. But this mutual limitation which Barthold Niebuhr tried in vain to reverse led to the development of an emphasis peculiar to the German language. Geschichte assumed the sense of history and drove Historie out of general linguistic usage. As history Geschichte converged as event and representation, the linguistic basis was laid for the transcendent turning point leading to the historical philosophy of idealism.
Geschichte as the context of action was incorporated into its knowledge. History as unique event or as a universal relation of events was clearly not capable of instructing in the same manner as history in the form of exemplary account. The scholarly boundaries of rhetoric, history, and ethics were undermined, and thus the old formula gained new forms of experience from the new linguistic usage. Luden, for example, argued that the weight of proof in historical teachings consisted, if anything, in the events themselves.
It is up to each person to either make use of its lessons or neglect them. If, then, history could speak only for itself, a further step was possible which completely flattened the formula and rendered it a tautological shell. All three variants demarcated a new experiential space within which the old Historie had to revoke its claim to be magistra vitae. Although it survived, it lost this claim to Geschichte.
This brings us to a second point. This curious expression, which today is quite usual, dates from the second half of the eighteenth century. To the degree that Geschichte displaced Historie, so the former assumed a different character.
Initially, and in order to emphasize the new meaning, one spoke freely of history in and for itself, of history pure and simple, of history itself—from History. Since the French Revolution, his- tory has become a subject furnished with divine epithets of omnipotence, universal justice, and sanctity.
Here as well, the German language had made some preparations. The semantic abundance and contemporary novelty of the word Geschichte derived from the fact that it concerned a collective singular. Up until the middle of the eighteenth century, the expression die Geschichte generally prevailed in the plural.
It is really interesting to fol- low the imperceptible and unconscious manner in which, ultimately with the aid of extensive theoretical reflection, the plural form die Geschichte condensed into a collective singular. It was first lexically noted in by Adelung, in anticipation of the coming development. Increasingly, historical narrative was expected to provide the unity found in the epic derived from the existence of Beginning and End.
This became clear in the dispute on Pyrrhonism. This became subject to demand for intensified reality long before it was able to satisfy such a demand. It persisted in the form of a collection of ethical examples, although with the devaluation of this role, the value of res factae shifted with respect to res fictae. The collective singular permitted yet a further step. It made possible the attribution to history of the latent power of human events and suffering, a power that connected and motivated everything in accordance with a secret or evident plan to which one could feel responsible, or in whose name one could believe oneself to be acting.
This philological event occurred in a con- text of epochal significance: that of the great period of singularization and simplification which was directed socially and politically against a society of estates. And with respect to France, one might add that the central place the Revolution in its singularity occupies in Western thought is, in the German language, assigned to Geschichte.
The French Revolution brought to light the concept of history charac- teristic of the German Historical School. Both of these smashed the preced- ing models, while at the same time apparently incorporating them. If an event became the object of and set in motion unique and genuine forces, this set to one side the direct applicability of historical mod- els. It was not the historical view of the world as such that led—above all, in the transmission of our idiom through historiographies founded on natural law55—to the abandonment of direct application of its doctrine.
It was, rather, that hidden behind the relativization of all events consumed by historia magistra was a general experience also shared by those in the camp opposed to the progressives. This brings us to a third point. It is no accident that in the same decades in which history as a collective singular began to establish itself between and , the concept of a philosophy of history also surfaced. They substantially adopted or transformed western writers.
What was common to all, however, was the destruction of the exem- plary nature of past events and, in its place, the discovery of the uniqueness of historical processes and the possibility of progress. It is linguistically one and the same event which constituted history in the sense customary today, and on this basis gave rise to a philosophy of history. For it is, where a complete section of history Historie , or a whole historical science, is dealt with, nothing more than history Historie in itself.
This involves what one might call a temporalization of history, which has since that time detached itself from a naturally formed chronology. Up until the eighteenth century, the course and calculation of historical events was underwritten by two nat- ural categories of time: the cycle of stars and planets, and the natural succes- sion of rulers and dynasties. The naturalistic basis vanished, and progress became the prime category in which a transnatural, historically immanent definition of time first found expression.
Insofar as philosophy conceived history in the singular and as a unitary whole and transposed it in this form into Progress, our topos was inevitably robbed of meaning. With such a history functioning as the solitary source of the education of the human race, it was natural that all past exam- ples lost their force. Individual teachings disappeared into a general peda- gogic arrangement.
The ruse of reason forbade man to learn directly from history and indirectly forced him toward happiness. The extent to which this new historical temporality was based on just this experience was quick to show itself with the revival of the revolution in Spain in It arrives for individuals always too late, while for governments and peoples it is never available.
This is because past experience presents itself concentrated in a single focus, while that which has yet to be experienced is spread over minutes, hours, days, years, and centuries; thus similitude never appears to be the same, for in the one case one sees the whole, and in the lat- ter only individual parts. Even if they could, as in with the revival of the revolution, the history that awaits us deprives us of the ability to experience it. A concluded experience is both complete and past, while those to be had in the future decompose into an infinity of different temporal perspectives.
It is not the past but the future of historical time which renders simili- tude dissimilar. With this Reinhard demonstrated the temporality peculiar to the processual nature of a modern history, whose termination is unfore- seeable. This leads us to another variant of our topos which alters itself in the same direction.
It frequently occurred in connection with historia magistra that the historian did not only have to teach, but also had to form opinions and on the basis of these make judgments. Another, by no means weaker, attack came from an apparently opposed direction. This was that, fourthly, consistent Enlighteners tolerated no allusion to the past. It is a creation, in which—as in the creation of the uni- verse—everything that is present is but raw material in the hand of the creator by whom it is transformed into existence.
Answer: when the soothsayer himself shapes and forms the events that he had predicted in advance. Since the future of modern history opens itself as the unknown, it becomes plannable—indeed it must be planned. And with each new plan a fresh degree of uncertainty is introduced, since it presupposes a lack of experience.
The one is founded on the other, and vice versa. Common to both is the decomposition of the traditional experiential space, which had previously appeared to be determined by the past, but which would now break apart. A byproduct of this historical revolution was that historical writing now became not so much falsifiable as subject to manipulation. But it sought in vain to trump amnesty with amnesia. Behind all that has been said up to now: behind the singularization of history, its temporalization, unavoidable superiority, and producibility, can be registered an experiential transformation that permeates our modernity.
In this process, Historie was shorn of the objective of directly relating to life. Since that time, moreover, experience seemed to teach the opposite An unassuming witness who summarizes this experience for us is the modest and intelligent Perthes, who wrote in If each party were to take turns at governing and organizing institu- tions, then all would, through their self-made history, become more reasonable and wise.
History made by others, no matter how much written about and studied, seldom gives rise to political reasonableness and wisdom: that is taught by experience. Counsel is henceforth to be expected, not from the past, but from a future which has to be made.
Historians engaged in a critical recon- struction of the past were at one with progressives who, in agreeing that no further utility was to be gained from the directives of an exemplary Historie, consciously placed new models at the forefront of the movement. This brings us to our last feature, which contains a question. What was common to this new experience, whose uniqueness had previously been determined by the temporalization of history?
We do indeed lack a general word for the period and in view of this we should like to call it the Epoch of Revolutions. The requisite experience for differentiating time in general is, how- ever, that of acceleration and retardation.
Chateaubriand drew up while in emigration in a parallel of the new and the old revolutions, whence he drew conclusions from the past for the future in the usual manner. But he was soon forced to realize that whatever he had written during the day was by night-time already overtaken by events.
It seemed to him that the French Revolution led into an unparalled open future. Thus, thirty years later, Chateaubriand placed himself in a historical relation by republishing his outdated essay, unchanged in substance, but with added notes suggesting progressive constitutional prognoses.
Kant was the first to foresee this modern system of historical experi- ence when he established a temporally indeterminate, but nevertheless ulti- mate, goal for the repetition of revolutionary attempts. Mazzini, Marx, and Proudhon can be named as the first revolutionary teachers seeking to apply such lessons. According to party or position, the categories of acceleration and retardation evident since the French Revolu- tion alter the relations of past and future in varying rhythm.
This principle is what Progress and Historism share in common. It also becomes comprehensible, against the background of this acceler- ation, why the writing of contemporary history, Gegenwartschronik, was left behind,81 and why Historie failed to keep abreast of an increasingly changing actuality. Historism—like the historical philosophy of Progress—reacted to this by placing itself in an indirect relation to Gesch- ichte. However much the German Historical School conceived itself as con- cerned with a science of the past, it did nonetheless fully exploit the dual meaning of the word Geschichte and seek to elevate history into a reflexive science.
Here, the individual case lost its politico-didactic character. Historism can relate to history only indirectly. Henry Adams was the first to make a serious attempt at dealing method- ically with this problem. He developed a theory of movement that dealt simultaneously with Progress and History, and that was specified by his questioning of the structure of historical time.
Adams proposed a law of acceleration as he called it , on the basis of which standards were continu- ally altered, since the acceleration of the future constantly foreshortened resort to the past. The one invokes the other, and vice versa. And it is this semantic relationship that will be addressed in the following.
While practically every newspaper talks of the second industrial revolution, historical science is still arguing about the way in which the nature and inauguration of the first should be defined. This second industrial revolution not only relieves the world of physical exertion, but also entrusts intellectual processes to automatic machines.
Cybernetics, atomic physics, and biochemistry are all included in the concept of the second industrial revolution; the first is left far behind, related as it is to the use of capital, technology, and the division of labor in extending human productivity beyond existing needs. Generally accepted demarcation criteria are lacking. Likewise, we read daily of the Marxist program for world revolution, formulated originally by Marx and Lenin and then, in particular, inscribed by Mao Zedong on the banners of the Chinese Communist Party.
More recently, the concept of Cultural Revolution has become a part of the domestic Chinese situation, the clear purpose of which is to impel disrup- tion into Chinese sensibility, dictating revolution into the body as it were. Legal and illegal Communist emissaries, charged with the realization of this program, are active in many countries of the world, especially in underdeveloped countries.
It is well- known that the universal program has in Asia itself been constrained by the alternative of Russian and Chinese models. It ranges from bloody political and social convulsions to deci- sive scientific innovations; it can signify the whole spectrum, or alternatively, one form to the exclusion of the remainder.
A successful technical revolu- tion, therefore, presupposes a minimum of stability, which in turn rules out sociopolitical revolution, even when the latter may be a precondition or con- sequence of the former. If this were so then we would have a political slogan whose composition assured its constant reproduction, as well as seeking to transform the situation itself.
What is there in the world that could not be revolutionized—and what is there in our time that is not open to revolutionary effects? Posing the ques- tion to our concept in this way indicates the modernity of its content. If one can characterize our modern history as an era of revolution—one which has not yet come to its end—a certain direct experience is embodied in this formulation.
Typical of this experience is the fact that it can be sub- sumed under the concept of revolution, more indeed than is perhaps gener- ally allowed. That it is possible to distinguish political, social, technological, and industrial revolutions has been accepted since the last century. In the following we shall trace the history of our concept back to the period before the great French Revolution, so that we might separate out some particularities of modern experience, and thus be able to recognize them more clearly.
In keeping with its lexical sense, rev- olution initially signified circulation. According to ancient doctrine, there were only a limited number of constitutional forms, which dissolved and replaced each other but could not naturally coincide. These are the constitutional forms, together with their corruptions, still cur- rent today, succeeding each other with a certain inevitability.
Then followed the well-known schema in which aristocracy was transformed into oligarchy, which was in turn displaced by democracy, which degenerated ultimately into ochlocracy, or mass rule. Here, in fact, no one ruled any longer, and the way to individual rule was open once more.
Hence, the old cycle could begin anew. Here we have a model of revolution which found expression in Greek as metabolh politeiwn or as politeiwn ahacuclwsid,3 and which subsisted on the experience that all forms of political association were ultimately limited. Each change led to a familiar form of rule within which men and women were confined; and it was impossible to break out of this natural cycle. All variation, or change, rerum commutatio, rerum conver- sio, was insufficient to introduce anything novel into the political world.
His- torical experience remained involved in its almost natural givenness, and in the same way that the succession of the seasons remains forever the same, so mankind qua political beings remained bound to a process of change that brought forth nothing new under the sun. In the course of the seventeenth century, the concept of revolution emerged to characterize this quasi-natu- ral experience. The path- breaking work of Copernicus on the circular movement of celestial bodies, De revolutionibus orbium caelestium, appeared in and opened the way for the concept of revolution which entered politics via the prevalent astrol- ogy of that time.
In the same way that the stars run their circular course independent of earthly men, while at the same time influencing or even determining their lives, this dual meaning resonated through the polit- ical concept of revolution from the seventeenth century on: revolutions do take place above the heads of their participants, but those concerned for instance, Wallenstein remain imprisoned in their laws.
Overtones of this double meaning can without any doubt be heard in our contemporary linguistic usage. One of the victors, Clarendon who still blamed the stars for the recent disorder , could quite consistently, after the final return of the Stuarts, celebrate the upheaval as a Restoration. What is to us apparently incomprehensible was then placed together.
The termination and objective of the twenty-year revolution was Restoration. Hence, monarchists and republicans stood closer together than they could then admit: it was for both a matter—terminologically—of the restoration of ancient law, of a return to the true constitution. While it was always debatable at what point in the ebb and flow of a revolutio one would place the present or desired constitutional state, this remained, from the point of view of the circulatory process, a sec- ondary question.
All political positions remained preserved in a transhistor- ical concept of revolution. Quite different expressions were usual for the bloody struggles them- selves, and for the blind passion with which conflicts during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were conducted. These definitions ranged from uprising and revolt to riot, insurrection, and rebellion, and on to Zweiung, internal and civil war. While the mode of government might alter, the social order itself was seldom directly displaced by civil war; the consequences were at most postponed to the long- term.
For the most part, the old civil war remained a war among qualified members of orders, i. And if in Germany we do not refer to the Thirty Years War as a civil war—as corre- sponding events in neighboring countries are called—it is because the Impe- rial constitutional character of this war has altered with the termination of thirty years of struggle.
What had begun as a civil war between the Protestant Imperial orders and the Imperial party ended with a peace treaty between almost sovereign territorial states. Our religious civil war could thus be interpreted ex post as a war between states. These legal titles constituted in concrete struggle a mutual exclusiveness, marking the current enemy as a rebel against the law.
In this way State became the counterconcept to Civil War, appropriating all title of right claimed by the latter. The State, symbolically elevated in the Baroque era as a person, prohibited bellum intestinum by monopolizing the right of force domestically and the right to declare war externally. It is against this background that the meaning of a revolution still existed.
It referred to a model course of political constitutional struggle which remained entirely predetermined. Along with the repeatability of constitutional forms, politi- cal revolution could also be conceived as repetition. Social emancipation as a revolutionary process still lay outside experience. This would change in the course of the eigh- teenth century in the epoch of Enlightenment.
Everything that was seen and described was conceived in terms of change or upheaval.
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|Vuyyuru r torrent||This experience of history, founded as it was on repeatability, bound prospective futures to the past. Begriffsgeschichte and Social History 75 6. Revolution covered morals, law, religion, econ- omy, countries, states, and portions of the earth—indeed, the entire globe. Cybernetics, atomic physics, and biochemistry are all included in the concept of the second industrial revolution; the first is left far behind, related as it is to here use of capital, technology, and the division of labor in extending human productivity beyond existing needs. Hence, the old cycle could begin anew. To be more precise, texts were sought out and interrogated that, explicitly or implicitly, deal with the relation of a torrent past to a given future. In pdf, the Revolution liberated a new future, whether sensed as pro- gressive or as catastrophic, and in the same fashion a new past; the increas- ingly alien quality of the latter rendered it a special object of historical- critical science.|
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|Uimitorul om paianjen 2 download torrent fifa 14||Overtones of this double meaning can without any doubt be heard in our contemporary linguistic usage. Buying options eBook EUR For the modern profes- sional revolutionary, the determined struggle by legal as well as illegal means belongs to the anticipated course of a revolution; the revolutionary feels free to use any means available because the revolution is, for him, legitimate. Frederick lived, after the embit- tering struggles reiser bd pdf torrent the Seven Years War, with a dual fear. Geschichte assumed the sense of history and drove Historie out of general linguistic usage.|
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